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Autoren: 
Schindler, Dirk
Weigert, Benjamin
Datum: 
2008
Reihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper 2348
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a model of education where individuals face educational risk. Successfully entering the skilled labor sector depends on individual effort in education and public resources, but educational risk still causes (income) inequality. We show that an optimal public policy consists of deferred skill-specific tuition fees, lump-sum transfers/taxes, and public funding of the educational sector. We argue that improved educational opportunities matter more than direct income transfers in a Second-best setting. Contrary to standard models of income risk, it is not optimal to use a proportional wage tax, because combining skill-specific tuition fees and public education spending provide both insurance and redistribution at lower costs. A wage tax is only optimal if skill-specific tuition fees are not available.
Schlagwörter: 
Human capital investment
endogenous risk
learning effort
optimal taxation
public education
JEL: 
H21
I2
J2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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