Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26390 
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dc.contributor.authorLong, Ngo Vanen
dc.contributor.authorSengupta, Bodhisattvaen
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-22-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:18Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:18Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26390-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the relationship between electoral incentives, institutions and corruption. We assume that voters use a yardstick criterion. The incumbent provides a public good and extracts rent, which are financed by imposing a distortionary tax. We demonstrate the possibility that yardstick competition itself fails to restrict rent seeking. We complement the static setting with a dynamic scenario where each incumbent politician faces an election after a finite, fixed term. Under relative performance evaluation, dynamic incentives impose more restriction on rent appropriation in comparison to the static case.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2345en
dc.subject.jelH11en
dc.subject.jelH73en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordYardstick competitionen
dc.subject.keywordrent-seekingen
dc.subject.keywordpublic gooden
dc.subject.keywordelectoral incentivesen
dc.subject.stwYardstick Competitionen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen
dc.subject.stwWahlen
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleYardstick competition, corruption, and electoral incentives-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn572270704en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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