Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26390
Authors: 
Long, Ngo Van
Sengupta, Bodhisattva
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2345
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the relationship between electoral incentives, institutions and corruption. We assume that voters use a yardstick criterion. The incumbent provides a public good and extracts rent, which are financed by imposing a distortionary tax. We demonstrate the possibility that yardstick competition itself fails to restrict rent seeking. We complement the static setting with a dynamic scenario where each incumbent politician faces an election after a finite, fixed term. Under relative performance evaluation, dynamic incentives impose more restriction on rent appropriation in comparison to the static case.
Subjects: 
Yardstick competition
rent-seeking
public good
electoral incentives
JEL: 
H11
H73
H77
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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