Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26388 
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dc.contributor.authorLeininger, Wolfgangen
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-22-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:16Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:16Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26388-
dc.description.abstractWe define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock) contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that the indirect evolutionary approach yields the same more aggressive behavior, too. This holds for any population size N, if evolution of preferences is determined by behavior in two-player contests. The evolutionarily stable preferences (ESP) of the indirect approach turn out to be negatively interdependent, thereby ”rationalizing” the more aggressive behavior.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2343en
dc.subject.jelC79en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordContestsen
dc.subject.keywordpreference evolutionen
dc.subject.keywordevolutionary stabilityen
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwEvolutionäre Spieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleEvolutionarily stable preferences in contests-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn57226979Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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