Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26379 
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dc.contributor.authorChoné, Philippeen
dc.contributor.authorLinnemer, Laurenten
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-24-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:31:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:31:10Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26379-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the strategic effects of case preparation in litigation. Specifically, it shows how the pretrial efforts incurred by one party may alter its adversary's incentives to settle. We build a sequential game with one-sided asymmetric information where the informed party first decides to invest, or not, in case preparation, and the uninformed party then makes a settlement offer. Overinvestment, or bluff, always prevails in equilibrium: with positive probability, plaintiffs with weak cases take a chance on investing, and regret it in case of trial. Furthermore, due to the endogenous investment decision, the probability of trial may (locally) decrease with case strength. Overinvestment generates inefficient preparation costs, but may trigger more settlements, thereby reducing trial costs.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2334en
dc.subject.jelK41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCase preparationen
dc.subject.keywordsettlementen
dc.subject.keywordtrialen
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen
dc.subject.stwZivilprozessen
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen
dc.subject.stwSchiedsgerichtsbarkeiten
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOptimal litigation strategies with signaling and screening-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn57021761Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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