Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/263714 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9784
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of at least three agents: If endowments are sufficiently large, any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.
Subjects: 
mechanism design
social preferences
Bayesian implementation
participation constraints
participation stimulation
JEL: 
C72
C78
D62
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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