Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/263303 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1166
Publisher: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Abstract: 
The class of double-crossing preferences, where signaling is cheaper for higher types than for lower types at low signaling levels and the opposite is true at high signaling levels, underlines the phenomenon of countersignaling. We show that under the D1 refinement, the equilibrium signaling action must be quasi-concave in type and generally exhibits pooling, with intermediate types choosing higher actions than higher and lower types. We provide an algorithm to systematically construct an equilibrium and use this algorithm to establish its existence for this general class of preferences with an arbitrary discrete-type distribution.
Subjects: 
countersignaling
weak pairwise-matching condition
minimum allocation
low types separate and high types pairwise-pool
JEL: 
D82
I21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
719.41 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.