Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26281
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dc.contributor.authorTabellini, Guidoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-28en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:29:57Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:29:57Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26281-
dc.description.abstractWhat explains the range of situations in which individuals cooperate? This paper studies a model where individuals respond to incentives but are also influenced by norms of good conduct inherited from earlier generations. Parents rationally choose what values to transmit to their offspring, and this choice is influenced by the spatial patterns of external enforcement and of likely future transactions. The equilibrium displays strategic complementarities between values and current behavior, which reinforce the effects of changes in the external environment. Values evolve gradually over time, and if the quality of legal enforcement is chosen under majority rule, there is path dependence: adverse initial conditions may lead to a unique equilibrium where legal enforcement remains weak and individual values discourage cooperation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x2236en_US
dc.subject.jelA10en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcooperationen_US
dc.subject.keywordvaluesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcultureen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economicsen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Werteen_US
dc.subject.stwKulturpsychologieen_US
dc.subject.stwEigeninteresseen_US
dc.subject.stwGemeinwohlen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe scope of cooperation: values and incentivesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn559092377en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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