Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26281 
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dc.contributor.authorTabellini, Guidoen
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-28-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:29:57Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:29:57Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26281-
dc.description.abstractWhat explains the range of situations in which individuals cooperate? This paper studies a model where individuals respond to incentives but are also influenced by norms of good conduct inherited from earlier generations. Parents rationally choose what values to transmit to their offspring, and this choice is influenced by the spatial patterns of external enforcement and of likely future transactions. The equilibrium displays strategic complementarities between values and current behavior, which reinforce the effects of changes in the external environment. Values evolve gradually over time, and if the quality of legal enforcement is chosen under majority rule, there is path dependence: adverse initial conditions may lead to a unique equilibrium where legal enforcement remains weak and individual values discourage cooperation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2236en
dc.subject.jelA10en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen
dc.subject.keywordcooperationen
dc.subject.keywordvaluesen
dc.subject.keywordcultureen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economicsen
dc.subject.stwKooperationen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Werteen
dc.subject.stwKulturpsychologieen
dc.subject.stwEigeninteresseen
dc.subject.stwGemeinwohlen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe scope of cooperation: values and incentives-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn559092377en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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