Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/262713 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
New Working Paper Series No. 311
Verlag: 
University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, Chicago, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
Bankers are directors of Federal Reserve Banks. I document that a) banker directors of the New York Fed attend more meetings about the financial sector; b) elections for Reserve Bank directorships are more contested for bankers, but less so for large banks and American Banking Association directors; d) the market reaction to bankers' elections to Reserve Bank boards is 1%; e) the market reaction to insider purchases is 1.3% higher when banker directors are on a Reserve Bank board; f) Fed enforcement actions appear more moderate for banker directors. Reserve Bank directorships appear to be good news for some banks.
Schlagwörter: 
Federal Reserve
Director
Banks
Conflicts of Interest
Political Connection
Reputation
Insider Trading
Enforcement Actions
Regulatory Capture
JEL: 
E58
G28
G30
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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