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dc.contributor.authorDalle Nogare, Chiaraen
dc.contributor.authorRicciuti, Robertoen
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-14-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:29:30Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:29:30Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26244-
dc.description.abstractAccording to reputational models of political economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 52 countries over the period 1977-2000, using government spending, social and welfare spending and deficit as policy choice variables using panel data estimation techniques. We are unable to find significant differences in the behavior of term-limited and non term-limited chief executives. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results based on U.S. states and international data.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2199en
dc.subject.jelE62en
dc.subject.jelH11en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordterm limitsen
dc.subject.keywordcomparative politicsen
dc.subject.keywordfiscal policyen
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken
dc.subject.stwRegelgebundene Politiken
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Schuldenen
dc.subject.stwSystemvergleichen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwUSAen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleTerm limits: do they really affect fiscal policy choices?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn558346324en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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