Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26243 
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dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen
dc.contributor.authorFahrenberger, Theresaen
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-14-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:29:29Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:29:29Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26243-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects where the first-period project may have a long-lasting impact. In the first period a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting only voting losers keep the voting right in the second period. We show that as soon as absolute risk aversion exceeds a threshold value minority voting is superior to repeated application of the simple majority rule.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2198en
dc.subject.jelD7en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordvotingen
dc.subject.keywordminorityen
dc.subject.keyworddurable decisionen
dc.subject.keywordrisk aversionen
dc.subject.keywordtyranny of majority rulesen
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsregelen
dc.subject.stwMinderheiten
dc.subject.stwWahlsystemen
dc.subject.stwZeitkonsistenzen
dc.subject.stwRisikoaversionen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.titleMinority voting and long-term decisions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn558345530en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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