Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26213 
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dc.contributor.authorMatsen, Egilen
dc.contributor.authorThøgersen, Øysteinen
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-07-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:29:07Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:29:07Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26213-
dc.description.abstractWe suggest a probabilistic voting model where voters' preferences for alternative public goods display habit formation. Current policies determine habit levels and in turn the future preferences of the voters. This allows the incumbent to act strategically in order to influence the probability of re-election. Comparing to a benchmark case of a certain re-election, we demonstrate that the incumbent's optimal policy features both a more polarized allocation between the alternative public goods and a debt bias.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2169en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.jelH62en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordbudget deficitsen
dc.subject.keywordvotingen
dc.subject.keywordextremismen
dc.subject.keywordhabit formationen
dc.subject.stwPolitiken
dc.subject.stwIdeologieen
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Ausgabenen
dc.subject.stwHaushaltsdefiziten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleHabit formation, strategic extremism and debt policy-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn557979080en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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