Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26201
Authors: 
Haufler, Andreas
Schulte, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2157
Abstract: 
In many situations governments have sector-specific tax and regulation policies at their disposal to influence the market outcome after a national or an international merger has taken place. In this paper we study the implications for merger policy when countries non-cooperatively deploy production-based taxes. We find that whether national or international mergers are more likely to be enacted in the presence of nationally optimal tax policies depends crucially on the ownership structure of firms. When all firms are owned domestically in the pre-merger situation, non-cooperative tax policies are more efficient in the national merger case and smaller synergy effects are needed for this type of merger to be proposed and cleared. These results are reversed when there is a high degree of foreign firm ownership prior to the merger.
Subjects: 
merger regulation
tax competition
JEL: 
H21
H77
L13
L50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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