Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26188
Authors: 
Konrad, Kai A.
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2144
Abstract: 
If countries anticipate Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that makes some of their tax payers less mobile or increases the mobility of tax payers elsewhere. I provide piecemeal evidence on what activities countries use. I analyse how such activities interact with Bertrand tax competition if the size of the group of loyal and non-loyal citizens or investors is endogenous. Further I consider the implications of tax harmonization and minimum taxes for these types of non-price competition. Home attachment reduces the intensity of tax competition, but generates a strategic disadvantage for the country that invests much in such home attachment. Harmonization of taxes and high minimum taxes can intensify countries' investment in home attachment.
Subjects: 
tax competition
common pool
advertizing
nation brands
instilling preferences
home bias
patriotism
JEL: 
H77
F21
F22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.