Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/261863 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] BRQ Business Research Quarterly [ISSN:] 2340-9436 [Volume:] 22 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Elsevier España [Place:] Barcelona [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 216-225
Verlag: 
Elsevier España, Barcelona
Zusammenfassung: 
It may be surprising that one of the most popular compensation schemes in business is so open to being hacked - to having managers cheat to win. We explore tournament theory to detail its vulnerabilities to various forms of cheating unilateral and multilateral. We identify who is most likely to be involved and under what conditions. We describe the costs to the victims, to the firm, and to society. We outline the possible strategic effects - in terms of firm performance. And, we discuss possible ways to address these vulnerabilities to the schemes we rely on to motivate managers to put in the right efforts, to take the right risks, and to lead the right way.
Schlagwörter: 
Cheating
Managerial compensation schemes
Tournament theory
Vulnerabilities
JEL: 
M52
J33
D82
J31
D73
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.