Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26181 
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dc.contributor.authorBrueckner, Jan Keithen
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-06-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:28:44Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:28:44Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26181-
dc.description.abstractThe fiscal decentralization impulse now sweeping the world often leads to partial decentralization, where subnational governments are funded by central transfers, rather than leading to full local autonomy. Despite the practical important of this arrangement, the literature contains no economic analysis of a partial decentralization regime in a Tiebout-style model. This paper provides such an analysis, relying on the key assumption that public-good provision requires effort on the part of government officials. By choosing different degrees of effort, localities can then provide different public-good levels even when a fixed, common transfer constrains them to spend the same amount. A number of useful results are derived.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2137en
dc.subject.jelH1en
dc.subject.jelH7en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwFiskalische Dezentralisierungen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwInstitutioneller Wettbewerben
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePartial fiscal decentralization-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn557909325en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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