Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26181
Authors: 
Brueckner, Jan Keith
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2137
Abstract: 
The fiscal decentralization impulse now sweeping the world often leads to partial decentralization, where subnational governments are funded by central transfers, rather than leading to full local autonomy. Despite the practical important of this arrangement, the literature contains no economic analysis of a partial decentralization regime in a Tiebout-style model. This paper provides such an analysis, relying on the key assumption that public-good provision requires effort on the part of government officials. By choosing different degrees of effort, localities can then provide different public-good levels even when a fixed, common transfer constrains them to spend the same amount. A number of useful results are derived.
JEL: 
H1
H7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
230.19 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.