Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26132
Authors: 
Sinn, Hans-Werner
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 2087
Abstract: 
Judged by the principle of intertemporal Pareto optimality, insecure property rights and the greenhouse effect both imply overly rapid extraction of fossil carbon resources. A gradual expansion of demand-reducing public policies - such as increasing ad-valorem taxes on carbon consumption or increasing subsidies for replacement technologies - may exacerbate the problem as it gives resource owners the incentive to avoid future price reductions by anticipating their sales. Useful policies instead involve sequestration, afforestation, stabilization of property rights and emissions trading. Among the public finance measures, constant unit carbon taxes and source taxes on capital income for resource owners stand out.
JEL: 
O13
Q32
Q54
H23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
840.63 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.