Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/261239 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2022-01
Publisher: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Abstract: 
The rise of a new power may lead the dominant power to seek a preventive war. We study this scenario in an experimental two-stage bargaining game. In each stage, the rising power makes a bargaining offer and the declining power must choose whether to accept it or fight. Between the two stages, the winning probability shifts towards the rising power. We find fewer preventive wars when the power shift is smaller and when the rising state has the commitment power. Communication and repeated interaction decrease the likelihood of preventive wars. High fighting costs almost eliminate such wars when the rising power's first-stage offer is sufficiently large.
Subjects: 
power shift
commitment
bargaining
conflict
communication
JEL: 
C72
C91
F51
N40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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