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dc.contributor.authorKonstantinidis, Nikitasen
dc.date.accessioned2008-01-02-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:16:11Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:16:11Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26121-
dc.description.abstractThis paper introduces a new theoretical framework of international unions qua coalitions of countries adopting a common policy and common supranational institutions. We introduce a general class of non-cooperative spatial bargaining games of coalition formation among three countries in order to examine the endogenous strategic considerations in the creation and enlargement of international unions. Why would we observe a gradualist approach in the formation of the grand coalition even if the latter is assumed to be weakly efficient? We propose uncertainty about the benefits of integration as a mechanism that can generate gradual union formation in equilibrium. As it turns out, it may well be in the core' countries' interest to delay the accession of a third, peripheral country in order to i) stack the institutional make-up of the initial union in their favor and ii) signal their high resolve to wait out the expansion of their bilateral subunion. A related case from the European Union provides an interesting illustration.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2076en
dc.subject.jelF53en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftsunionen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Integrationen
dc.subject.stwKoalitionen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwMehr-Länder-Modellen
dc.subject.stwEuropäische Integrationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleGradualism and uncertainty in international union formation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn555908445en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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