Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/261099 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFR Working Paper No. 18-02
Versionsangabe: 
Vers. 06/2022
Verlag: 
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
We show that in countries with more societal trust shareholders cast fewer votes at shareholder meetings and are more supportive of management proposals. This result is confirmed by instrumental variable regressions. It also holds at the U.S.-county level and for voting by U.S. institutional investors. Lower monitoring via voting relates less negatively to future firm performance in high-trust countries, suggesting that managers do not exploit greater discretion when trust is high. We also find a negative relation between trust and bond spreads. Our evidence supports theory arguing that trust substitutes for monitoring and has implications for investors' optimal monitoring effort.
Schlagwörter: 
Culture
Monitoring
Shareholder expropriation
Shareholder voting
Societal trust
JEL: 
G3
G19
G32
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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