Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/261062 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WWZ Working Paper No. 2021/09
Verlag: 
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
Banks all over the world show interest in acting as venture capitalists. In this paper, I argue that banks offer venture capital (VC) financing along with traditional (collateralized) loans in response to the natural constraints of the hidden information that they face. Innovative entrepreneurs pursue new technology that promises high return but runs a high risk of failure. The more innovative entrepreneurs also have higher reservation utility. This interaction between type-dependent returns and reservation utility creates a situation where collateral alone is not sufficient to screen entrepreneurs, and the uninformed bank needs an additional screening device. VC fulfils that role.
Schlagwörter: 
Bank
Venture Capital
Collateral
Debt
Screening
JEL: 
G21
G24
D86
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.