Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/261010 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2019-04
Publisher: 
The University of Utah, Department of Economics, Salt Lake City, UT
Abstract: 
The paper explores how elites can develop capacity for collective agency through coordination. Elites' challenge is to simultaneously deter the state from abusing power while at the same time relying on it to discipline defectors in their midst. The basic insight holds that the credibility of the state's threats depends on the cost of carrying them out, which elites can have control over if they can act in tandem. Elites can coordinate in being compliant when the ruler's threats serve their collective interest which raises the threats' credibility, while lowering that of those they dislike by their coordinated noncompliance making them costly to carry out.
Subjects: 
elite collective agency
state power
coordination
credible threats
subgame imperfect equilibrium
JEL: 
C72
D72
D02
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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