Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26086 
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dc.contributor.authorHefeker, Carstenen
dc.contributor.authorNeugart, Michaelen
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-27-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:15:46Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:15:46Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26086-
dc.description.abstractWhen enacting labor market regulation governments face courts that interpret and implement the legal code. We show that the incentives for governments for labor market reform increase with the uncertainty that is involved in the implementation of legal codes through courts. Given that judges have more discretion in common as opposed to civil law systems more reform activity as a response to crises should be observed in the former system. This finding is backed by evidence from a panel of OECD countries.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2041en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.jelK31en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarktpolitiken
dc.subject.stwArbeitsrechtsprechungen
dc.subject.stwRisikoen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarktflexibilisierungen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwOECD-Staatenen
dc.titleLabor market regulation and the legal system-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn538340908en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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