Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26086
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dc.contributor.authorHefeker, Carstenen_US
dc.contributor.authorNeugart, Michaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:15:46Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:15:46Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26086-
dc.description.abstractWhen enacting labor market regulation governments face courts that interpret and implement the legal code. We show that the incentives for governments for labor market reform increase with the uncertainty that is involved in the implementation of legal codes through courts. Given that judges have more discretion in common as opposed to civil law systems more reform activity as a response to crises should be observed in the former system. This finding is backed by evidence from a panel of OECD countries.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x2041en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelK31en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarktpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsrechtsprechungen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarktflexibilisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwOECD-Staatenen_US
dc.titleLabor market regulation and the legal systemen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn538340908en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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