Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260827 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9697
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
How important are political parties in motivating and disciplining elected officials? Using a difference-in-discontinuity design, we study how shocks to incumbents’ re-election probabilities affect legislative behavior in a setting where parties fully control candidate selection. We find that within-session variation in lame-duck status has a strong negative effect on the probability of showing up in parliament to vote. We find, however, no clear evidence that lame-duck status affects the extent to which legislators deviate from the party line. Our findings align well with the citizen-candidate framework, where candidates have fixed ideological positions that do not vary based on electoral incentives.
Subjects: 
political parties
party discipline
roll-call votes
legislative speech
difference-in-discontinuity design
JEL: 
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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