Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260692 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] IZA World of Labor [ISSN:] 2054-9571 [Article No.:] 244v2 [Publisher:] Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) [Place:] Bonn [Year:] 2021
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Ever since the major inflow of refugees (the "refugee crisis") in 2015 and 2016, there has been heated debate about the appropriate distribution of refugees in the EU. Current policies revolve around mandatory quotas, which disregard the preferences of EU members and refugees alike. This problem can be addressed with two market mechanisms. First, tradable quotas minimize the cost of asylum provision for host countries. Second, a matching system gives refugees more discretion over where they are sheltered. While this proposal is theoretically appealing, it has yet to be tested in practice.
Subjects: 
international migration
refugees
EU asylum policy
tradable quotas
matching
public goods
JEL: 
F22
H87
K33
O19
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Article

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