Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26059 
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dc.contributor.authorDemougin, Dominique M.en
dc.contributor.authorFluet, Claudeen
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-26-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:15:26Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:15:26Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26059-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the design of legal principles and procedures for court decision-making in civil litigation. The objective is the provision of appropriate incentives for potential tort-feasors to exert care, when evidence about care is imperfect and may be distorted by the parties. Efficiency is shown to be consistent with courts adjudicating on the basis of the preponderance of evidence standard of proof together with common law exclusionary rules. Inefficient equilibria may nevertheless also arise under these rules. Directing courts as to the assignment of the burden of proof is then useful as a coordination device. Alternatively, burden of proof guidelines are unnecessary if courts are allowed a more active or inquisitorial role, by contrast with that of passive adjudicator.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2014en
dc.subject.jelD8en
dc.subject.jelK4en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwZivilprozessen
dc.subject.stwVerfahrensrechten
dc.subject.stwHaftungen
dc.subject.stwRechtsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleRules of proof, courts, and incentives-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn538296224en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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