Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26059
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDemougin, Dominique M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorFluet, Claudeen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:15:26Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:15:26Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26059-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the design of legal principles and procedures for court decision-making in civil litigation. The objective is the provision of appropriate incentives for potential tort-feasors to exert care, when evidence about care is imperfect and may be distorted by the parties. Efficiency is shown to be consistent with courts adjudicating on the basis of the preponderance of evidence standard of proof together with common law exclusionary rules. Inefficient equilibria may nevertheless also arise under these rules. Directing courts as to the assignment of the burden of proof is then useful as a coordination device. Alternatively, burden of proof guidelines are unnecessary if courts are allowed a more active or inquisitorial role, by contrast with that of passive adjudicator.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x2014en_US
dc.subject.jelD8en_US
dc.subject.jelK4en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwZivilprozessen_US
dc.subject.stwVerfahrensrechten_US
dc.subject.stwHaftungen_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleRules of proof, courts, and incentivesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn538296224en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
328.94 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.