Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260591 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
arqus Discussion Paper No. 270
Verlag: 
Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre (arqus), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
This study investigates to what extent multinational enterprises appoint managers jointly at the headquarter and a foreign subsidiary (vertical manager interlocks, VMIs) in order to facilitate tax planning. We use a cross-section data set taken from the AMADEUS database to show that VMIs are observed more frequently in MNEs with a higher potential for tax-induced profit shifting. We also provide evidence indicating that the implementation of VMIs is motivated by an internal principal-agent conflict arising from conflicting interests between the MNE and high-tax subsidiary managers. Finally, we show that the use of VMI structures is associated, ceteris paribus, with a lower effective tax rate.
Schlagwörter: 
management structure
profit shifting
principal-agent-theory
JEL: 
H25
H26
M12
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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