Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26044
Authors: 
Geraats, Petra Maria
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 1999
Abstract: 
Central bank independence and transparency have become best practice in monetary policy. This paper cautions that transparency about economic information may not be beneficial in the absence of central bank independence. The reason is that it reduces monetary uncertainty, which could make the government less inhibited to interfere with monetary policy. In fact, a central bank could use monetary mystique to obtain greater insulation from political pressures, even if the government faces no direct cost of overriding. As a result, economic secrecy could be beneficial and provide the central bank greater political independence.
JEL: 
E58
E52
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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