Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260240 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2018:11
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
We experimentally explore the role of collective incentives in sustaining cooperation in finitely repeated public goods games with imperfect monitoring. In our experiment players only observe noisy signals about individual contributions, while total output is perfectly observed. We consider sanctioning mechanisms that allow agents to commit to collective punishment in case total output fall short of a target. We find that cooperation is higher in the case of collective punishment compared to both the case of no punishment and the case of standard peer-to-peer punishment which conditions on the noisy signals. Further experiments indicate that both the commitment possibility and the collective nature of punishment matter for the positive effect of collective incentives on cooperation.
Subjects: 
Public goods game
Team production
Punishment
Collective sanctions
Imperfect monitoring
JEL: 
C72
D02
D23
D90
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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