Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260227 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2017:18
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
This paper provides sufficient conditions under which convex monotonic evolutionary dynamics (a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic) select against strategies that do not survive iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We apply these conditions to Bertrand duopolies, first-price auctions, finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas, and the p-Beauty Contests. Our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against all iteratively strictly dominated strategies.
Subjects: 
Iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies
Iterated admissibility
Payoff monotonicity
Convex monotonicity
Evolutionary dynamics
Replicator dynamic
JEL: 
C72
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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