Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260155 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2015:17
Verlag: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Zusammenfassung: 
How malleable are people's fairness ideals? Although fairness is an oft-invoked concept in allocation situations, it is still unclear whether and to what extent people's allocations reflect their fairness ideals. We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether people's fairness ideals vary with respect to changes in the order in which they undertake two allocation tasks. Participants first generate resources in a real- effort task and then distribute them. In the partial allocation task, the participant determines the earnings for himself and another participant. In the impartial allocation task, the participant determines the earnings for two other participants. We also manipulate the participants' experience, i.e., whether they took part in similar allocation experiments before. We find that participants are more likely to allocate more resources to themselves than what they earned in the real-effort task when they decide partially. Exclusively for inexperienced participants, deciding impartially first dampens selfish behavior when they decide partially.
Schlagwörter: 
Fairness
Proportionality Principle
Dictator
Partial Stakeholders
Impartial Spectators
Fairness Bias
JEL: 
C72
C91
D63
D64
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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