Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26003
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dc.contributor.authorKrasa, Stefanen_US
dc.contributor.authorPolborn, Mattiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:14:45Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:14:45Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26003-
dc.description.abstractWe introduce a general framework in which politicians choose a (possibly infinite) sequence of binary policies. The two competing candidates are exogenously committed to particular actions on a subset of these issues, while they can choose any policy for the remaining issues to maximize their winning probability. Citizens have general preferences over policies, and the distribution of preferences may be uncertain. We show that a special case of the model, the weighted-issue model, provides a tractable multidimensional model of candidate competition that can generate (i) policy divergence in pure and mixed strategies, (ii) adoption of minority positions, and (iii) inefficient outcomes.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x1958en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD60en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwMedian Voteren_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleMajority-efficiency and competition-efficiency in a binary policy modelen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn538092815en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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