Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260020 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2011:31
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
This paper proposes an iterative sealed-bid auction for selling multiple heterogeneous items with unit-demand agents. It generalizes the single item bisection auction (Grigorieva Et. al, 2007) to the environment with multiple heterogeneous items. We show that it elicits a minimal amount of information on preferences required to find the Vickrey-Clark-Groves outcome (Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973, Vickrey, 1961), when there are two items for sale and an arbitrary number of agents.
Subjects: 
Bisection Auction
Multi-item
Unit-demand
Sealed-bid
JEL: 
C72
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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