Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26001 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1956
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We study the social interaction of non-smokers and smokers as a sequential game, incorporating insights from social psychology and experimental economics into an economic model. Social norms affect human behavior such that non-smokers do not ask smokers to stop smoking and stay with them, even though disutility from smoking exceeds utility from social interaction. Overall, smoking is unduly often accepted when accommodating smoking is the social norm. The introduction of smoking and non-smoking areas does not overcome this specific inefficiency. We conclude that smoking bans may represent a required (second-best) policy.
JEL: 
I18
D01
D11
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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