Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25997 
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dc.contributor.authorRedoano, Michelaen
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-24-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:14:40Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:14:40Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25997-
dc.description.abstractWe use a panel of European countries to investigate whether or not governments interact with their neighbors when they decide their fiscal policy; we consider both taxes and expenditures, at aggregate and at separate aspects of policy. We analyse possible different competitive behaviours and find evidence of fiscal interdependencies consistently with the literature on tax and yardstick competition. For corporate taxes, the regression results suggest that European countries follow large countries in order to attract capital; for income taxes and public expenditures, instead, fiscal interactions exist but they are mainly due to yardstick competition. Finally, we have found the countries are interdependent with each others before joining the EU, and than, once they are in, they become more independent.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1952en
dc.subject.jelH2en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.jelH87en
dc.subject.jelD7en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Finanzplanungen
dc.subject.stwSteueraufkommenen
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen
dc.titleFiscal interactions among European countries.: does the EU Matter?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn538089539en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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