Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/259953 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2008:4
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
Beliefs in signals that reveal lies or truths are widespread. These signals may lead to a truth or lie detection bias if the probability that such a signal is perceived by the receiver is contingent on the truth value of the sender's message. Such detection biases are analyzed theoretically in a bluffing game. The detection bias shrinks the equilibrium set to a unique non-pooling equilibrium, in which the better a player is at detecting lies the more often the opponent player will lie. With proper deception techniques such biases can in principle be used to extract hidden information.
Subjects: 
Bluffing
Game theory
Truth detection
Lie detection
Detection bias
JEL: 
C72
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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