Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/259916 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2005:33
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
A simple symmetric 2 "e 2 strategic coordination game is analyzed in an evolutionary environment under the assumption that agents are able to condition their actions on observations made of the opponent. Agents are assumed to be associated with a profile of characteristics, of which all agents can make a noisy observation. Actions can be conditioned on how the observed characteristics relates to that of their own. It is shown that there exist feasible states under which evolutionary pressure will transform any population conditioning its actions through a genetically induced continuous characteristic, such as body length, into a population conditioning its actions through Status, or how well agents have done in previous games. It is also shown that there does not exist feasible states by which a population conditioning its actions through Status could be invaded by any other strategies.
Subjects: 
Coordination
Hawk-Dove Games
Status
Positional Concerns
Conditioned Strategies
Evolutionary Equilibrium
JEL: 
C70
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
329.34 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.