Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25991
Authors: 
Schaltegger, Christoph A.
Feld, Lars P.
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 1946
Abstract: 
A common political claim is that decentralized governments undermine policy makers' ability to fight fiscal imbalance. This paper examines how different fiscal institutions influence the likelihood of a successful fiscal adjustment. Using a panel of the Swiss cantons from 1981 to 2001, we first analyze the episodes of tight fiscal policy and their macroeconomic consequences. Then, we empirically investigate the determinants of successful long-lasting deficit reductions. Contrary to the popular claim, we find that fiscal decentralization increases the probability of a successful fiscal consolidation. In addition, the results point to an important role of intergovernmental grants and the circumstances, in particular the size of fiscal imbalance in the years before the consolidation in determining a successful adjustment policy. Furthermore, coalition governments and large parliaments less likely implement successful fiscal stabilizations. Finally, there is some weak evidence that spending cuts are more promising in reaching a long-lasting fiscal adjustment than revenue increases.
Subjects: 
fiscal adjustment
consolidation policy
fiscal decentralization
fiscal institutions
JEL: 
E61
E63
H61
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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