Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/259904 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2005:15
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
According to theories of screening and signaling, a temporary worker who shows effort should increase the probability of obtaining a permanent contract. We use two types of signals of effort: overtime and low levels of absenteeism to investigate i) whether temporary workers show more effort and ii) whether effort has a positive effect on the exit probability into permanent employment. We find that temporary workers have lower levels of absenteeism than permanent ones, but also lower levels of overtime work. Effort has little effect on the exit probability into permanent employment. However, using a competing risks model we find that working overtime decreases the probability of becoming unemployed.
Subjects: 
Temporary jobs
signals
absenteeism
overtime
exit
competing risk
JEL: 
J20
J40
J69
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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