Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/259835 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2000:5
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
This paper analyses the case when the political struggle not is channeled through policy choices, but through what information to adopt. The paper presents a simple model to analyze collective decisions of adopting new information when different parties' payoffs are contingent upon the new information. In equilibrium we demonstrate that the adopted information is biased towards "political correctness" rather than being informative (in the Blackwell sense). These results may be relevant when designing decision mechanisms for institutions that are to be keen on new information.
Subjects: 
Informativeness
Majority Rule
Political Correctness
JEL: 
D23
D70
D72
D81
L30
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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