Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/259719 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics [ISSN:] 2235-6282 [Volume:] 154 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 1-15
Publisher: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
Creative accounting allows governments and, more particularly, finance ministers to somehow manage financial reports to achieve specific and possibly self-interested goals. It is usually used to hide deficits. It sometimes also helps to present financial performance as being more worrisome than it actually is. In that case, ministers press more than needed for lower expenses and a higher tax burden. This pressure is expected to tame deficits or increase surpluses over time. Using panel data relative to the 26 Swiss cantons over the period 1980-2013, we estimate econometrically how a political finessing technique like "depreciations management" affects subsequent government expenses and revenues and thus subsequent financial performance.
Subjects: 
Creative accounting
Depreciations management
Government deficits
Swiss cantons
Simultaneous equation model
JEL: 
C23
D73
H62
H72
H83
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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