Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/2596 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorFehn, Raineren
dc.contributor.authorMeier, Carsten-Patricken
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T14:29:47Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T14:29:47Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/2596-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Some countries especially in continental Europe exhibit a corporatist politicoeconomic equilibrium with a sustantial protection of insiders on both markets. The more important money is in political decision-making, the more devided the workface is, and the more globalized capital markets are, the more likely is a capitalist politicoeconomic equilibrium with little employment and substantial investor protection. Our prediction of a negative cross-country relationship between labor market rigidities and of competition on capital markets receives considerable empicical support.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x456en
dc.subject.jelG34en
dc.subject.jelK22en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordlabor marketsen
dc.subject.keywordemployment protectionen
dc.subject.keywordcorporatismen
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governanceen
dc.subject.keywordshareholder protectionen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarktflexibilisierungen
dc.subject.stwKorporatismusen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsrechten
dc.subject.stwAktienrechten
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen
dc.subject.stwInsider-Outsider-Modellen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleThe positive economics of labor market rigidities and investor protection-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn751418943en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
131.71 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.