Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25955 
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dc.contributor.authorHagen, Rune Jansenen
dc.contributor.authorTorsvik, Gauteen
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-23-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:14:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:14:10Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25955-
dc.description.abstractWe study a model where two parties, one from the left and one from the right, compete for position. The election is to be held in the near future and the outcome is uncertain. Prior to the election, the members of both parties nominate their prime ministerial candidates. Investors care about the outcome since they may invest in irreversible domestic production capital. We find that there is political convergence in the nomination process. In some circumstances, it is only the median voter of the left-wing party that elects a more moderate candidate. In other instances, the members of both parties nominate more “conservative” candidates, but there is still convergence. We also show that a higher probability of the left winning the election increases the degree of convergence, while a more globalised economy (greater capital mobility) reduces it.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1910en
dc.subject.jelE61en
dc.subject.jelF21en
dc.subject.jelH24en
dc.subject.jelP16en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Parteien
dc.subject.stwPolitisches Zielen
dc.titleIrreversible investments, dynamic inconsistency and policy convergence-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn538026227en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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