Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25913
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dc.contributor.authorEichner, Thomasen
dc.contributor.authorRunkel, Marcoen
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-10-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:13:38Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:13:38Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25913-
dc.description.abstractWithin a two-country model with involuntary unemployment, this paper investigates corporate income taxation under separate accounting versus formula apportionment. In contrast to separate accounting, under formula apportionment the corporate tax policy causes a fiscal externality which goes back to unemployment. This unemployment externality is the lowest when the apportionment formula does not contain a payroll factor. It tends to compensate other externalities such that tax rates become inefficiently low. In an empirical calibration, we show that the transition from separate accounting to formula apportionment improves welfare and reduces unemployment. The welfare increase is the strongest under a pure sales formula.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1868en
dc.subject.jelH25en
dc.subject.jelH71en
dc.subject.jelJ60en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleCorporate income taxation of multinationals and unemployment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn528729845en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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