Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25897 
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dc.contributor.authorAnderlini, Lucaen
dc.contributor.authorFelli, Leonardoen
dc.contributor.authorPostlewaite, Andrewen
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-09-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:13:27Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:13:27Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25897-
dc.description.abstractWe describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without it. The institutional role of the court is to maximize the parties' welfare under a veil of ignorance. In Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) the possibility of menu contracts between the informed buyer and the uninformed seller is described but not analyzed. Here, we fully analyze this case. We find that if we maintain the assumption that one of the potential objects of trade is not contractible exante, the results of Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) survive intact. If however we let all widgets be contractible ex-ante, then multiple equilibria obtain. In this case the role for an active court is to ensure the inefficient pooling equilibria do not exist alongside the superior ones in which separation occurs.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1852en
dc.subject.jelC79en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.jelD89en
dc.subject.jelK40en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleActive courts and menu contracts-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn528601881en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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