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dc.contributor.authorRichter, Wolfram F.en
dc.date.accessioned2006-12-14-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:13:13Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:13:13Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25877-
dc.description.abstractAssuming decreasing returns to education and the endogenous supply of qualified and nonqualified labour it is shown to be efficient to supplement a consumption tax with positive incentives for education. If the return from education is isoelastic and if the choice is between (i) subsidizing the monetary cost of education and (ii) taxing nonqualified labour income more heavily than qualified labour income while keeping the effective cost of education constant, the latter policy is shown to be second-best efficient. In particular, any tax distortions should be constrained to labour choices while the choice of education should remain undistorted. The result holds for arbitrary utility functions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1832en
dc.subject.jelH2en
dc.subject.jelI2en
dc.subject.jelJ24en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwBildungsverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwLohnsteueren
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwQualifikationen
dc.subject.stwDoppelte Dividendeen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleTaxing human capital efficiently: the double dividend of taxing non-qualified labour more heavily than qualified labour-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn521169070en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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