Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25848 
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dc.contributor.authorSchnellenbach, Janen
dc.contributor.authorFeld, Lars P.en
dc.contributor.authorSchaltegger, Christoph A.en
dc.date.accessioned2006-10-11-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:12:52Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:12:52Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25848-
dc.description.abstractThe paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the noncooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1803en
dc.subject.jelH73en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwZentralstaaten
dc.subject.stwZwei-Regionen-Modellen
dc.subject.stwSpillover-Effekten
dc.subject.stwDemokratieen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe impact of referendums on the centralisation of public goods provision: a political economy approach-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn518576655en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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