Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25848
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dc.contributor.authorSchnellenbach, Janen_US
dc.contributor.authorFeld, Lars P.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSchaltegger, Christoph A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-10-11en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:12:52Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:12:52Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25848-
dc.description.abstractThe paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the noncooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x1803en_US
dc.subject.jelH73en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwZentralstaaten_US
dc.subject.stwZwei-Regionen-Modellen_US
dc.subject.stwSpillover-Effekten_US
dc.subject.stwDemokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe impact of referendums on the centralisation of public goods provision: a political economy approachen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn518576655en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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