Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25836 
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dc.contributor.authorKessing, Sebastian G.en
dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-07-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:12:43Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:12:43Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25836-
dc.description.abstractHigh employment protection in the public sector results in strategic over-employment if government divisions compete for budgets in a dynamic setting. Bureaucrats who are interested in maximising their divisions' output employ excess labor, since this induces the sponsor to provide complementary inputs in the future. Restrictions on hiring decisions in the public sector can be regarded as provisions to reduce strategic hiring. We also provide evidence from a survey of decision makers in a public sector bureaucracy with very high employment protection. The results confirm that decision makers are aware of the strategic effects of their hiring decisions on budget allocation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1791en
dc.subject.jelH11en
dc.subject.jelH61en
dc.subject.jelH83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwÖffentlicher Diensten
dc.subject.stwKündigungsschutzen
dc.subject.stwPersonalbedarfen
dc.subject.stwÖffentlicher Haushalten
dc.subject.stwVerwaltungskostenen
dc.subject.stwZeitkonsistenzen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleTime consistency and bureaucratic budget competition-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn517152851en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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