Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25836
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dc.contributor.authorKessing, Sebastian G.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:12:43Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:12:43Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25836-
dc.description.abstractHigh employment protection in the public sector results in strategic over-employment if government divisions compete for budgets in a dynamic setting. Bureaucrats who are interested in maximising their divisions' output employ excess labor, since this induces the sponsor to provide complementary inputs in the future. Restrictions on hiring decisions in the public sector can be regarded as provisions to reduce strategic hiring. We also provide evidence from a survey of decision makers in a public sector bureaucracy with very high employment protection. The results confirm that decision makers are aware of the strategic effects of their hiring decisions on budget allocation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x1791en_US
dc.subject.jelH11en_US
dc.subject.jelH61en_US
dc.subject.jelH83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentlicher Diensten_US
dc.subject.stwKündigungsschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwPersonalbedarfen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentlicher Haushalten_US
dc.subject.stwVerwaltungskostenen_US
dc.subject.stwZeitkonsistenzen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleTime consistency and bureaucratic budget competitionen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn517152851en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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