Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25817
Authors: 
Cigno, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 1772
Abstract: 
A Beveridgean pension scheme invariably reduces the marginal return to labour, and will thus discourage labour. A Bismarckian scheme can do so only if it is not actuarially fair, or in the presence of credit rationing. In any case, the same pension contribution will discourage labour less if the scheme is Bismarckian than if it is Beveridgean. A Bismarckian scheme may even encourage labour.
JEL: 
H31
H55
J38
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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